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This article, based overwhelmingly on primary sources produced by the Yu-
goslav State Security Service, provides a historical overview of their work 
with respect to the commemorations at Bleiburg. It summarizes the stance of 
the Yugoslav State Security Service towards Croat émigrés by focusing on 
the concrete measures and the e ntire spectrum of available methods under-
taken by the Service in conjunction with the commemorations. After a gene-
ral summary of the work of the Yugoslav security services with respect to 
émigrés, the article provides detailed examination of two events separated 
by two decades (1966 and 1985). The 1966 commemoration was notable not 
only because it was the year in which the émigrés purchased a plot of land in 
Bleiburg, but also because the aftermath of that year’s commemoration was 
marred by a bomb attack. The second case is the fortieth anniversary com-
memoration in 1985, which was perceived by both the agents of the Yugoslav 
state and the émigrés themselves as being particularly important. Together the 
two cases provide insight into the Yugoslav State Security Service’s long-term 
operation aimed at curtailing and suppressing Croat émigré activity. The arti-
cle shows that even though the Yugoslav State Security Service was willing to 
use violent means in this struggle, the preferred means remained infiltration, 
disinformation, provocation, and constant surveillance.
Keywords: Bleiburg, Yugoslav State Security Service, Croatian Émigrés, Com-
memorations
Introduction
Throughout the existence of socialist Yugoslavia, the state’s intelligence services 
closely monitored the activities of Croat émigrés scattered throughout the diaspora. 
Given that Bleiburg represented a central event in the Croat émigré community, the 
commemoration of the mass killings also served as a useful focus for those who 
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wished to monitor and counter the intentions of these émigrés.1 This article will 
provide an overview of the work of the Yugoslav State Security Service with re-
spect to the commemorations at Bleiburg. After first summarizing the stance of the 
Yugoslav State Security Service towards Croat émigrés, the article will focus on the 
concrete measures undertaken by the Service in conjunction with the commemora-
tions. As space does not allow for an extensive analysis of the entire history of the 
Yugoslav State Security Service’s operations covering the Bleiburg commemora-
tions, the article will provide a more detailed examination of two events separated 
by two decades. After a general summary of the work of the Yugoslav security ser-
vices with respect to émigrés, I will first describe the case of the commemoration 
that took place in 1966. This commemoration was notable not only because it was 
the year in which the émigrés purchased a plot of land in Bleiburg, but also because 
the aftermath of that year’s commemoration was marred by a bomb attack. The se-
cond case I will examine is the fortieth anniversary commemoration in 1985, which 
was perceived by both the agents of the Yugoslav state and the émigrés themselves 
as being particularly important. Together the two cases will provide insight into 
the Yugoslav State Security Service’s operations with respect to the Bleiburg com-
memorations.
Before proceeding to the specific topic of this article, a few words regarding 
the structure of the Yugoslav security services are necessary. The structure of the 
Yugoslav State Security Service (Služba državne bezbednosti, SDB), the primary 
civilian security service, mirrored that of the federal Yugoslav state. At the pinnacle 
stood the Federal State Security Service which was a constituent part of the Federal 
Secretariat for Internal Affairs (Savezni sekretarijat za unutrašnje poslove, SSUP). 
Below this, each of the six republics had its own republican secretariat for internal 
affairs; within Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina also each had provincial secretariats 
for internal affairs. All of these secretariats had constituent state security services. 
After the purge in 1966 of Aleksandar Ranković – the original head of the Yugoslav 
State Security Service – and especially after the promulgation of the new constitu-
tion in 1974, the republican and provincial secretariats for internal affairs enjoyed 
greatly increased powers. Nevertheless, even after 1974 all operations outside the 
borders of Yugoslavia required the permission of the SSUP SDB, not only in or-
der to initiate a given operation but also on a running basis during the operation 
itself. 
1 In the existing literature, the events in Bleiburg in May 1945 have been qualified in many dif-
ferent ways, up to and including the use of the term “genocide”. As it is not the intention of this 
article to qualify, legally or otherwise, these events, I use the term “mass killings” as a simple 
descriptive characterization. Martina Grahek Ravančić provides an overview of much of the ter-
minology and historiography about Bleiburg (Grahek Ravančić, 2015).
Croatian Political Science Review, Vol. 55, No. 2, 2018, pp. 50-70
52
The primary focus here is on the Yugoslav State Security Service, by which is 
meant all of its aforementioned component parts. Besides the SSUP SDB and its 
subordinate services, a number of other Yugoslav security services also undertook 
operations related to the suppression of hostile émigré activities. The Federal Se-
cretariat for Foreign Affairs (Savezni sekretarijat za inostrane poslove, SSIP) main-
tained its own civilian intelligence service, the Service for Research and Documen-
tation (Služba za istraživanje i dokumentaciju, SID).2 The SID made extensive use 
of Yugoslav embassies and consulates to counteract émigré activity. In addition to 
organizing and participating in covert operations, the SID also interacted with for-
eign governments by both making representations to them about the harmful nature 
of extreme émigrés and by demanding that state authorities take appropriate repres-
sive measures against anti-Yugoslav activities. The SID also monitored the foreign 
press and intervened to prevent or protest against reporting that was perceived to be 
hostile towards Yugoslavia. 
On the military side, two separate services participated in monitoring émigré 
activity. One was the Security Administration of the Federal Secretariat for People’s 
Defense (Uprava bezbednosti Saveznog sekretarijata za narodnu odbranu). The 
other was the Second Administration of the General Staff of the Yugoslav People’s 
Army (Druga uprava Generalštaba Jugoslovenske Narodne Armije). The military 
services were primarily interested in counteracting any possible hostile actions that 
the émigrés might take with respect to military facilities and personnel in Yugo-
slavia. This interest linked logically to the presumption of a connection between 
NATO forces and Yugoslav émigrés in Western Europe and North America (Grubišić 
et al., 1986: 148). Although Yugoslavia had broken with the Soviet Union in 1948, 
the Yugoslav authorities continued to perceive the West as a threat to national secu-
rity. The Yugoslav leadership feared that both the East and the West could exploit 
émigré organizations as a resource against Yugoslavia (ibid.: 31, 96-97, 148-151, 
203-207). Hence, both with respect to émigré activities generally and the Bleiburg 
commemorations specifically, inter-agency cooperation existed.3
In the case of the Croats in Western Europe, the émigré community consisted 
of a mixture of veterans of the so-called Independent State of Croatia who had ar-
rived immediately after the Second World War, refugees from communist oppres-
sion who arrived in the years following the war, and economic migrants (Gastar-
2 The SID was earlier known as the Administration for Research and Documentation (Uprava 
za istraživanje i dokumentaciju, UID).
3 See, for example, SSIP SID, Security Information: Preparations of the Croat Hostile Emigra-
tion for the “Commemoration” in Bleiburg, 18 March 1985; SSUP SDB(?), Ustasha Emigration 
Held Traditional Commemoration of “Bleiburg Victims” in Bleiburg in Austria, 31 May 1985, 
Arhiv Republike Slovenije (ARS), f. 1931, RTZ 132 (OO “Pliberški vod”).
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beiter) who had settled in Western Europe with official permission starting in the 
early 1960s.
Seen with Yugoslav eyes, this mixture was a potentially volatile cocktail. In 
discussing “the hostile emigration” (neprijateljska emigracija), the Yugoslav State 
Security Service over time identified two categories: “the fascist emigration” 
(fašistička emigracija) and “the extreme emigration” (ekstremna emigracija). Ac-
cording to Obren Ž. Đorđević’s seminal course book on the foundations of state se-
curity, “among the fascist emigration are to be counted members of émigré organi-
zations whose goal is the creation of a fascist regime, or who by means of sabotage 
or terrorist activity engage in political struggle. Those émigré organizations which 
engage themselves against the constitutional order in our country are defined as the 
extreme emigration” (Đorđević, 1980: 152-153).
From the very outset of the Yugoslav state, the Yugoslav State Security Service 
undertook operations aimed at the émigré communities. In the early period, the fo-
cus was mainly on identifying the many thousands of alleged war criminals who 
had escaped abroad to avoid prosecution. In 1957, a formal desk (referat) for the 
surveillance of émigrés was established in the Second Department of the Federal 
State Security Service and in the republican state security services.4 The Second 
Department remained primarily responsible for émigrés in capitalist countries until 
the collapse of Yugoslavia.
Like all other aspects of the work of the Yugoslav State Security Service, the 
methods, rules, and regulations affecting the monitoring of émigrés were constantly 
revised. It is, however, possible to provide a general overview of the ambit of this 
work, as this was summarized in the reporting guidelines issued by the federal se-
cretary for internal affairs in both 1969 and 1975.5 As pertained to “enemy activity 
of the emigration”, the relevant constituent units of the State Security Service had 
to report on the following: 
1. The creation or attempted creation of illegal hostile organizations or groups 
in Yugoslavia on the part of the emigration or the joining of such organiza-
tions or groups;
2. The creation of hostile émigré organizations or groups with the intention of 
hostile activity against Yugoslavia;
4 Letter of Deputy State Secretary Đuro Stanković to the Slovenian Deputy Secretary Bogomir 
Peršić, 19 March 1957, ARS, f. 1931, šk. 1189.
5 SSUP SDB, “Regulations on the Manner of Reporting in the State Security Service”, 1969, 
ARS, f. 1931, šk. 1195; SSUP SDB, “Regulations on the Manner of Reporting in the State Secu-
rity Service”, 1975, ARS, f. 1931, šk. 2234. See also: SSUP SDB, “Regulations on the Amend-
ment of the Regulation on the Reporting in the State Security Service”, 1 May 1977, ARS, 
f. 1931, šk. 1463.
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 3. The organization of the illegal smuggling of persons or material over the 
Yugoslav border in order to undertake hostile activity, or the creation of 
smuggling channels or points or the participation in these on the part of the 
emigration or by persons, who are organized by the emigration; the cross-
ing of the border with forged travel documents;
 4. Activities of the emigration with the goal of preventing visits of leading 
Yugoslav officials to other countries and institutions;
 5. The sending of petitions, memoranda and other material with hostile con-
tent to foreign governments and institutions;
 6. Attempts to unite émigré organizations of various nationalities;
 7. Attempts to unite various émigré organizations of one nationality or the 
coordination of actions of individual organizations or groups;
 8. Contradictions and conflicts among individual leaders of émigré organiza-
tions, or among émigré organizations;
 9. The financial and other material support of the emigration by official or-
gans or representatives of the authorities;
 10. Bans and dispersals of émigré meetings by official organs because of hos-
tile activity against Yugoslavia;
 11. The expulsion by the police of émigrés who act hostilely towards other 
countries;
 12. The banning or dispersal of terrorist émigré organizations or groups by of-
ficial organs;
 13. The banning of terrorist activities by official organs;
 14. Measures of the security services in every documented case of hostile ac-
tivity.6
All of the items mentioned in this detailed list can be seen to have been imple-
mented in practice as regards the monitoring of the Bleiburg commemorations by 
the Yugoslav State Security Service.
Based on an examination of available documentation from the Croatian and 
Slovenian archives, one can conclude that the Yugoslav State Security Service re-
garded the Croat émigrés as the greatest threat of any émigré community. This as-
sessment was based on the importance of Croatia and Croats to Yugoslavia, the size 
of the Croat nation, the number of émigrés, and – not least – on the past existence of 
the NDH and the radical solutions advocated by some Croat émigrés. 
6 SSUP SDB, “Regulations on the Manner of Reporting in the State Security Service”, 1969, 
84-6, ARS, f. 1931, šk. 1195.
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The Yugoslav State Security Service had worked diligently since 1945 to coun-
teract Croat émigrés, and the Service availed itself of an entire array of measures 
ranging from dissuasion to targeted assassinations. However, the infiltration and 
armed uprising staged by Croat émigrés near Bugojno in 1972 further convinced 
the Yugoslav leadership that an offensive stance was necessary to combat the hos-
tile intentions of the émigrés.7 On 21 July 1972, President Josip Broz Tito issued a 
directive in which he spoke of a “special war”, that was being fought against Yu-
goslavia, within which the émigrés played an integral part.8 In accordance with the 
directive, the SSUP SDB decided that “the activity of the extreme emigration must 
be suppressed with all available methods and measures of the service in all regions 
and areas in which the emigration is located”.9 In order to effectuate this offen-
sive stance, the Yugoslav State Security Service had to establish “robust positions” 
in émigré structures and in particular monitor “the intellectual part of the hostile 
emigration”.10
The Bleiburg Commemorations
The following analysis is based primarily on archival sources stemming from the 
Archives of the Republic of Slovenia (ARS). In the ARS, the greatest concentration 
of documents related to Bleiburg can be found in RTZ 132 (Pliberški vod) and in the 
much larger RTZ 56 (Pevec), which covered Croat émigré activities.11 “RTZ” stood 
for registrirana tekoča zadeva (registered current affair) and was used to identify 
large operations involving the Slovenian State Security Service (Služba državne 
varnosti, SDV). RTZ 132 existed in the Slovenian SDV from 1964, and it was only 
officially closed in December 1990, approximately a half year after the first demo-
cratic elections in Slovenia.12
Generally speaking, the work of the Second Department of the Yugoslav State 
Security Service was organized in such a manner that each republic was primarily 
responsible for those émigrés who originally stemmed from (or had most recently 
resided in) the respective republic.13 However, owing to the proximity of Slove-
7 SSUP SDB, “Overview of the Newest Announcements of Sabotage and Terror Actions of the 
Extreme Part of the Emigration and Our Measures”, 18 September 1972. 
8 President Josip Broz Tito, “Directive”, 21 July 1972, ARS, f. 1931, šk. 1404.
9 SSUP SDB, “Operation ‘Raduša’”, 4 May 1973, 123-124, ARS, f. 1931, šk. 1160.
10 SSUP SDB, “Operation ‘Raduša’”, 4 May 1973, 123-124, ARS, f. 1931, šk. 1160.
11 The majority of these documents are available in ARS, f. 1931, šk. 2538-42. 
12 USDV RSZNS RS, Fifth Department, 19 December 1990, ARS, f. 1931, šk. 2538.
13 The Yugoslav State Security Service frequently changed internal terminology, and the Second 
Department was in the last decades known as the Second Administration at the federal level.
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nia to Austria, the Slovenian State Security Service also played an important role 
in monitoring Croat émigrés who were active in Austria, including at the Bleiburg 
commemorations. Since at least 1966, the SDV maintained an operational dossier 
called “Ustashe in Carinthia”.14
Because of their regular nature, the Bleiburg commemorations served a use-
ful purpose for the Yugoslav State Security Service. Commemorations obviously 
brought together a considerable number of people and provided an occasion for 
prominent members of the émigré community to hold speeches in which they ex-
pressed their political views. As such, the commemorations provided the Yugoslav 
State Security Service with a “who’s who of the anti-Yugoslav emigration” in Aus-
tria and West Germany and a convenient way of gauging émigré sentiments. The 
geographical proximity of the commemoration, right across the border from Yugo-
slavia, was simultaneously an advantage and a threat for the Yugoslav State Secu-
rity Service. In an evaluation of the SDV from September 1972, a connection was 
drawn between Croat extremists with terrorist intentions and the Bleiburg com-
memoration.15 In addition to the Yugoslav State Security Service, the SID also lent 
a hand in monitoring the Bleiburg commemorations.16 
The May 1966 Commemoration
In the early years of post-war Austria, the commemoration of Bleiburg was forbid-
den. Those Croat émigrés wishing to go to Bleiburg to pay their respects had to do 
so furtively and covertly. However, by the mid-1960s, the Austrian authorities be-
gan to tolerate the commemoration, and the émigrés moved to formalize their en-
gagement by purchasing a plot of land at Bleiburg field. Each year, a small but mo-
tivated group of émigrés would gather in Bleiburg in May, and again in November 
for All Saints’ Day.
A 1965 report, most likely authored by the SSUP SDB, on the “Ustasha emi-
gration in Carinthia” estimated that 350 of the 600 émigrés in Carinthia were loyal 
towards Yugoslavia.17 Of the remainder, 100 were estimated to be associated with 
the Bleiburg Honour Guard (Počasni bleiburški vod or PBV), which was based 
in Klagenfurt (Celovec). The PBV was headed by Niko Martinović, and the other 
senior members listed were Mirko Kračić, Ilija Abramović, Petar Miloš, and Adem 
14 UZNZ Maribor, Informational Report, 28 May 1966, ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132. DSC_0002.jpg.
15 SDV, Evaluation of the Security Situation in SR Slovenia, 12 September 1972 (cited in Elste 
et al., 2015: 152).
16 SSUP SDB, First Administration to SZNZ SRS UDV, 1 June 1966, ARS, f. 1931, šk. 2538. 
20131105_090131.
17 SSUP SDB(?), Report on Ustasha Emigration in Carinthia, 9 June 1965, ARS, f. 1931, šk. 
2538. 20131105_084320.jpg.
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Delić. The PBV was assessed to be an illegal organization as it was not properly 
registered with the Austrian authorities. The SSUP SDB wrote that 
the basic political activity of the Ustasha organization in Carinthia consists of 
maintaining the cult of the so-called victims of communism and Yugoslavia, 
whose symbol is represented by the Ustasha cemetery at Bleiburg (more specifi-
cally Unterloibach at Bleiburg – Spodnje Libuče), where the captured Ustasha 
army was allegedly liquidated in 1945. In addition, the activity regarding the com-
memoration of “10 April”, the name day of Ante Pavelić, as well as political acti-
vity of convenient religious character (1 November, the Assumption of Mary, 
etc.). Almost every political manifestation is camouflaged with some kind of litur-
gical and religious ceremony, which is conditioned by the position of the Austrian 
authorities, who forbid the Ustasha organization[s] from engaging in any political 
activity. ... The prime mover... in Carinthia is undoubtedly priest Vilim Cecelja 
(based in Salzburg) who practically runs this organization.18
The SSUP SDB caustically observed that the Carinthian émigré community 
consisted mostly of “primitive” and “almost illiterate” workers and peasants. There 
were “almost no intellectuals”, though Petar Miloš was noted as an exception. Most 
émigrés in Carinthia were unskilled labourers without solid financial means, and 
the SSUP SDB believed that they did not represent “any kind of factor”. Many were 
married to Austrian women.
In February 1966, the Slovenian SDV laid out several objectives with respect to 
Bleiburg, the first of which was the prevention of these émigrés’ activities through 
coordination with the Austrian police.19 The SDV intended to infiltrate the PBV and 
focus on covering the places where they regularly convened, such as the restaurant 
Hrust. Appended to the planning report was a list of names of relevant émigrés, 
including their dates of birth, their addresses and occupations and detailed infor-
mation about their cars. Collecting this information was not “a very difficult job. 
Émigrés unwillingly divulge information about themselves. Besides that, most of 
them introduce themselves with fake names and even officially give fake informa-
tion. It is impossible to arrive at complete and accurate information in a relatively 
short period of time.”20
18 SSUP SDB(?), Report on Ustasha Emigration in Carinthia, 9 June 1965, ARS, f. 1931, šk. 
2538. 20131105_084320.jpg. On the dissatisfaction expressed by the Austrian clergy in Blei-
burg regarding the commemorations, see RZNZ Slovenia, Information Report, 30 October 1965, 
ARS, f. 1931, šk. 2538. 20131105_084614.jpg.
19 SDV, Introductory Report for the Initiation of Processing of the Ustasha Group “Bleiburg 
Guard” in Klagenfurt, 23 February 1966, 20131105_083140.jpg, ARS, f. 1931, šk. 2538.
20 SSUP SDB(?), Broader List of Emigration on the Territory of the GK in Klagenfurt, undated, 
ARS, f. 1931, šk. 2538. 20131105_083839.jpg, list commences at 20131105_083609.jpg.
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According to a subsequent report of the SID, approximately 50 individuals par-
ticipated in the commemoration of Bleiburg on 8 May 1966. After the commemo-
ration, the group of émigrés headed to the nearby restaurant Hrust for lunch, but a 
few minutes before their (tardy) arrival a bomb went off in the restaurant. No one 
was injured in the explosion, but the lunch was called off and the local authorities 
immediately launched an investigation.21 
The SID was briefed directly on the investigation by the chief of what an in-
formant identified as the “Austrian state police in Klagenfurt”, Dr. Winkler. He 
speculated that the bomb could have been left by either a smaller group of pro-Yu-
goslavs, a rival group in the émigré community, or extreme Croats who wanted to 
draw attention to themselves. The SID also monitored the reaction to the incident 
in Austrian media and proactively intervened to have the local communist newspa-
per – Der Volkswille – print an attack on the extreme émigrés asking how long the 
authorities would tolerate “fascist groups on the very border”.22 None of the local 
newspapers pointed the finger at Yugoslavia, even though the Volkszeitung reported 
that the detonator was allegedly of Yugoslav origin. The Volkszeitung referred to the 
device as a “stink bomb”, which could easily have caused real injuries.23
The local police made the rounds among émigrés, warning them to abstain 
from threats against Yugoslavia and the local consulate. Apparently this warning 
did not dissuade the more extreme émigrés, who were almost unanimously con-
vinced that the Yugoslav State Security Service stood behind the bombing.24 The 
fear of being killed by the “Udba” – the catchall term used by émigrés to refer to the 
Yugoslav security services – was palpable, and there was dissatisfaction with the 
fact that the Austrian police was investigating the émigrés. 
It is worth underlining that nothing in the SID report betrayed anything more 
than rumours about the possible involvement of the Yugoslav State Security Service 
in the bombing. However, the documents of the Yugoslav State Security Service ex-
plicitly acknowledge that the bomb was placed by the Slovenian SDV and describe 
precisely how this was accomplished. On 12 May 1966, the First Sector of the SDV 
wrote to the Second Administration of the SSUP SDB reporting how three agents 
four days earlier had crossed from Yugoslavia over to Austria.25 The agents quickly 
21 There exist allegations that the bomb was placed by the Yugoslav State Security Service – and 
that the soup that was to be served had also been poisoned (Elste et al., 2015: 626). The SDV 
also monitored reporting in the Austrian press about the bombing. See also First Sector of SDV 
to SSUP SDB, Second Administration, 10 May 1966, ARS, f. 1931, šk. 2538.
22 SSUP SDB, First Administration to SZNZ SRS UDV, 1 June 1966, ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132.
23 SDV translation of article in Die Volkszeitung, 27 August 1966, ARS, f. 1931, šk. 2538.
24 UZNZ, Informational Report, 16 June 1966, ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132.
25 SDV, First Sector to Second Administration of SSUP SDB, 12 May 1966, ARS, f. 1931, šk. 2538.
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assembled the bomb, parts of which had been acquired as early as 1953. They then 
immediately went to the restaurant, where they placed a timed detonator in the res-
taurant before returning to Yugoslavia. The agents only spent 90 minutes in Austria. 
Fortunately for the émigrés, the timer on the detonator malfunctioned, exploding 
at 11:15 a.m. instead of at 1 p.m. The agents had used a British lighter in order to 
disguise the origin of the bomb, and the detonator was made in Yugoslavia, though 
without any indication that would betray the identity of the manufacturer.
Throughout the existence of socialist Yugoslavia, an interdependent relation-
ship existed between the real and alleged acts of the Yugoslav State Security Service 
and the real and alleged acts of extreme émigrés. Thus, immediately after the failed 
explosion, the thoughts of the émigrés turned to revenge. Already on the day of 
the explosion, the priest Vilim Cecelja, while claiming that divine intervention had 
averted a tragedy, claimed that the time had come for vengeance. “They will avenge 
themselves by organizing assassinations on Yugoslav representations in [West] Ger-
many and Austria.”26 
Notwithstanding the incident in May 1966, about 100 émigrés gathered again 
in Bleiburg in November, and the All Saints’ Day celebration once more featured 
lunch at the restaurant Hrust.27 The local informants of the Yugoslav Security Ser-
vice reported that the Austrian police had received orders to monitor the commemo-
ration closely and to collect detailed information about all participants. Petar Miloš 
stated to one of the informants that the police had told him that they had conclud-
ed that the Yugoslavs were behind the bomb that had exploded in May.28 In the 
meantime, the émigrés also directed a number of their vengeful thoughts towards 
the looming state visit of President Tito to Austria. This visit occurred in February 
1967, albeit without any violent incidents.29
26 UZNZ Celje, Informational Report, 16 June 1966, ARS, f. 1931, šk. 2538. 20131105_090204.
jpg. The phrase “assassinations on Yugoslav representations” (atentati na jugoslovanska 
predstavništva) is somewhat nonsensical, and could refer to assassinations of Yugoslav diplo-
mats and/or attacks on Yugoslav consulates and embassies or even Yugoslav (state) companies, 
all of which transpired. According to a May 1968 report, a bomb also exploded in the restaurant 
Hrust on 8 May 1968. Comparatively little information is available about this incident. SDV 
Maribor, Informational Report on Ustashe in Carinthia, 22 May 1968, ARS, f. 1931, šk. 2538.
27 UDV, Operational Information, 3 November 1966, ARS, f. 1931, šk. 2538.
28 UDV, Operational Information, 3 November 1966, ARS, f. 1931, šk. 2538.
29 UZNZ Murska Sobota, Information Report, 5 July 1966, ARS, f. 1931, šk. 2538; UNZ Mari-
bor, Report on Informants, 23 February 1967, ARS, f. 1931, šk. 2538. On Tito’s visit see also 
Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten Frank, 1 March 1967 (in Schwarz, 1998: 353-354). See 
also Hans Sima (2015: 114). 
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Intermezzo (1967-1984)
In the subsequent years, the Yugoslav State Security Service continued to monitor 
the Bleiburg commemorations and the activities of the PBV very closely. In 1967, 
the army also assisted the police station in Mežica, the border police and the SDV 
in monitoring the commemoration.30 Instructions were given in advance to local in-
formants so that both the preparations and the commemoration itself would receive 
adequate surveillance. The SDV was interested in obtaining information about the 
number of participants, the attitude, mood and comments of the participants and 
the local inhabitants, security measures implemented by the Austrian authorities, 
lunch arrangements, the content of the speeches in the church in Loibach, and the 
license plate numbers of participants’ vehicles. The SDV often had very detailed 
information from its informants, such as one who met with the wife of an Austrian 
police officer. She confided that she was unhappy with the extra burden imposed 
on her husband and his colleagues because of the commemoration. Another source 
summarized the content of the mass. The SDV noted the names of all travelers who 
passed the local border crossing between Austria and Yugoslavia on the day of the 
commemoration. 
As regards the Austrian authorities, the Yugoslav State Security Service was in-
terested in how they communicated, whether the police and gendarmerie came only 
from the local area or from other areas of Austria, and to what extent they them-
selves checked the identities of participants or interrogated them. In June 1967, the 
Slovenian State Security Service described the troubled economic state of the émi-
grés, who complained internally of how the Austrian police “harassed” them. “The 
majority of them are in their more mature years and there is not as much zeal as 
there was a few years ago.”31 And in May 1971, the deputy mayor of Bleiburg mu-
nicipality acerbically remarked that the Bleiburg commemoration was “insignifi-
cant, that it counted as a rally of homeless people, who represent nothing”.32 
Recording the identities of the participants in the commemoration ceremonies 
was obviously a significant part of the task of the Yugoslav State Security Service 
and their agents. Photographs were taken of the participants, and in some cases pho-
tos of particularly important Croat émigré figures were shown to informants to see 
whether they recognized these persons as having been present. Indeed, some Croats 
avoided the commemoration out of fear of being photographed.33 As technology ad-
30 UZNZ Maribor, Operational Report, 9 May 1967, ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132.
31 IDV Maribor, Report on Meeting with Informant “Petrič”, 12 June 1967, ARS, f. 1931, šk. 
2538.
32 SDV Maribor, Operational Report, 19 May 1971.
33 IDV Kranj, Informational Report, 10 June 1970.
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vanced, video recordings also later came to be used for this purpose.34 New partici-
pants were identified by their physical appearance if their names were not known 
to the observers. The Yugoslav State Security Service was intricately involved: an 
effort was made to ascertain who paid for the group lunch following the ceremony, 
and one informant’s wife participated in the preparation of the dining room. No de-
tail was too minor to be noted, as in the case where one informant reported that one 
participant had donated money in Deutschmarks.35
As was the case with all operations, exact accounts were maintained by the 
Yugoslav State Security Service of expenditures incurred. In addition to paying in-
formants in advance or later reimbursing their expenditures (in Austrian shillings), 
“reward” payments were also paid to some informants.
The Yugoslav authorities encouraged their colleagues in Austria not only to 
monitor the commemorations at Bleiburg but also to ban them outright. In October 
1972, the Second Administration of the SDB SSUP reported that it had received 
news from the SSIP that a commemoration in Bleiburg scheduled for All Saints’ 
Day had been banned by the Austrian authorities.36 All such future events were also 
to be banned – the reference here seemed to encompass only gatherings in Novem-
ber, not the annual commemorations in May. In addition, the Austrian police had 
spoken to the priest Vilim Cecelja and informed him that permission of the Aus-
trian Ministry of Internal Affairs was necessary to go to Bleiburg. However, the 
SDB SSUP expressed doubt that the ban would be enforced and recommended that 
monitoring of known emigrants proceed. From the available documentation, it is 
clear that the gathering of émigré Croats in Bleiburg on All Saints’ Day later re-
sumed.37
In May 1973, when the participants in the annual commemoration wanted to 
sing the Croatian national anthem “Lijepa naša domovino”, they were interrupted 
by officials of the Austrian state intelligence service, who informed the participants 
that they only had permission for a religious service. The singing of the song was re-
garded as a political act. One émigré tried in vain to argue that “the communist state 
had issued a whole record of this song”.38 Interestingly, one of the informants of the 
SDV, who had obtained access to the commemoration site by posing as a student at 
34 SDV Maribor, Informational Report, 23 July 1967, ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132.
35 SDV Maribor, Operational Report, 19 May 1971, ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132.
36 SSUP SDB Second Administration, Dispatch to RSUP SDB of BiH, Croatia and Slovenia, 27 
October 1972.
37 SSIP, Informational Report on Ustasha Manifestations at the Cemetery in Bleiburg, 16 No-
vember 1977.
38 SDV Maribor, Operational Report, 15 May 1973, ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132. 
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the university in Graz and a freelance reporter for the Neue Zeitung, was asked by 
one of the Austrian state security officers for his opinion about the decision to stop 
the singing of the anthem.39 The informant pretended not only to not know precisely 
what the song was about, but even claimed not to understand Croatian fluently, and 
opined that it was probably a political song.
The violent death of Nikola Martinović in 1975 arguably marks the peak of 
the Yugoslav State Security Service’s engagement against the Bleiburg commemo-
ration. Martinović was the president of the PBV. I will not here explore in detail 
the targeted killings perpetrated by the Yugoslav State Security service outside of 
Yugoslavia, although it has been established beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
Service did indeed carry out such assassinations (Nielsen 2015; 2016). An opera-
tions manual of the Yugoslav State Security Service from 1974 explicitly included 
“the physical destruction” of target persons as one possible operational outcome.40 
Suffice it to say that the work plan for the Slovenian SDV for the period from No-
vember 1974 to December 1975 specifically envisaged the “paralyzation” (parali-
zacija) of Martinović and his colleagues by May 1975, the thirtieth anniversary of 
Bleiburg.41 While it would be a mistake to treat the term “paralyzation” as a simple 
euphemism for assassination, it is irrefutable that Martinović was killed in Febru-
ary 1975. Yet other persons identified by the SDV as being close collaborators of 
Martinović were not killed.
In the 1970s and 1980s, there were indications that the Austrian authorities had 
adopted a more restrictive approach towards the commemoration. In 1981, the po-
lice informed Vilim Cecelja that the placing of a wreath was forbidden.42 Cecelja 
had also heard that Austrian consulates in West Germany were purposely delaying 
the issuing of visas to Croat émigrés. At any rate, the only wreath placed at Bleiburg 
in 1981 stemmed from the Croat Peasant Party (Hrvatska seljačka stranka, HSS), 
which was unsatisfactory for many more nationalist émigrés. The Austrian authori-
ties had furthermore banned the musical association Matija Gubec from perform-
ing, and several individual émigrés were refused access to the cemetery on the day 
of the commemoration.
The émigrés were well aware that the commemoration was under pressure 
from the Austrian authorities. One émigré was heard to say that “not much can be 
39 SDV Maribor, Operational Report, 15 May 1973, ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132.
40 SSUP, Center for Professional Education, “Operational Processing – Materials – Second 
Part”, 1974, 76, ARS, f. 1931, šk. 2308.
41 SDV, Work Plan of the Organs for Internal Affairs of SR Slovenia for the Protection of the 
Constitutional Order (November 1974 – December 1975), November 1974, 282.
42 SSIP to SDB SSUP, Second Administration, 29 May 1981, ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132. 
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said” in Bleiburg because of the restrictions imposed, and the SSIP noted with sa-
tisfaction that the police presence had been stronger and that the usually more vocal 
émigré members had been muted. “This year’s commemoration in Bleiburg, com-
pared to previous ones, has been significantly poorer in content and in the participa-
tion of émigrés who because of subjective or objective reasons could not or did not 
want to participate in the commemoration. The opinion of the majority of émigrés 
present is that this year’s Bleiburg was ‘poor and miserable’ and that it passed with-
out any kind of publicity.”43
At the All Saints’ Day celebration in November 1981, the Austrian police con-
tinued to apply similar restrictions. For instance, one bus with “pilgrims” from Han-
nover in West Germany was refused entry to Austria because some of the émigrés 
lacked Austrian visas. Because not all passengers had visas, all of them were de-
nied entry to Austria.44 Nonetheless, about 180 people did participate, and not all of 
them obeyed the instructions of the Austrian police banning political speeches and 
the display of Ustasha symbols. Hence, Cecelja referred to the alleged miraculous 
appearance of the Virgin Mary at Međugorje as a “warning” to Yugoslavia and to 
communists. He also warned those present to be wary, as four Croats had recently 
been killed by the Yugoslav State Security Service. Moreover, Cecelja criticized the 
United States of America for protecting “Serbs and Jews”.45
The May 1985 Commemoration
Marking the fortieth anniversary, the May 1985 commemoration was the final ma-
jor marking of Bleiburg prior to the collapse of Yugoslavia. Unsurprisingly, the Yu-
goslav authorities expressed particular concern regarding this commemoration.46 
Multiple émigré associations were involved in the planning, as there was a desire 
to project unity among the often dueling and bickering groups. The Croat Peasant 
Party, the émigré remnant of the dominant Croat political party in the inter-war pe-
riod, seemed again to be taking the lead in the planning. However, the president of 
the HSS, J. Krnjević, expressed fear that he could be kidnapped by the Yugoslav 
State Security Service, given the proximity of the Yugoslav border. The prospective 
participants also discussed toning down the anti-Yugoslav character of the ceremo-
43 SSIP to SDB SSUP, Second Administration, 29 May 1981, ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132. 
44 SDB SSUP(?), Informational Report on Émigré Demonstration Held in Bleiburg, 19 Novem-
ber 1981, ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132.
45 SDB SSUP(?), Informational Report on Émigré Demonstration Held in Bleiburg, 19 Novem-
ber 1981, ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132.
46 SDB SSUP, Preparations for the Marking of the “40th Anniversary of Bleiburg”, 19 December 
1984, ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132.
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ny in light of the anticipated measures that the Yugoslavs would request from their 
Austrian colleagues.
Compared to earlier decades, a softening of the Austrian stance towards the 
commemorations could be perceived in the early 1980s. By May 1985, the Aus-
trian authorities had decided to approve the registration of the Croat Cultural So-
ciety Bleiburg (Hrvatsko kulturno društvo Bleiburg, HKD Bleiburg), which had 
been founded in October 1982.47 However, the Austrians continued to insist upon 
obtaining exact lists of all participants from the organizers. Despite the pleas of the 
leader of the HKD, Petar Miloš, the Austrian police also still maintained a black-
list of persons forbidden from entering Austria and/or participating in the Bleiburg 
commemorations.48 The Bleiburg commemorations in both May and in November 
at All Saints’ Day were permitted, but the Austrian authorities demanded that the 
commemorations be of an “exclusively cultural character and be shorn of any kind 
of political characteristics”.49 The number of participants was not an issue, only the 
nature of the commemoration itself, and the participants must not (rhetorically) at-
tack the Yugoslav state. Émigrés were warned that violations of the ban against po-
litical speeches could lead to the dissolution of HKD Bleiburg. The Austrian police 
insisted on being updated regularly and in a detailed manner about the planning for 
the commemoration. This meant that HKD Bleiburg had to seek approval for their 
meetings and send the minutes to the police.
In the weeks leading up to the fortieth anniversary, the leaders of HKD Bleiburg 
remained concerned about the effect of restrictions on the commemoration. Having 
heard that they might be turned back at the Austrian border, some émigrés were re-
considering their attendance. Others worried that they would be filmed at Bleiburg, 
which could create problems for them or their relatives still remaining in Yugoslavia. 
Yet some members of HKD Bleiburg believed that the spectacle of Croats being re-
fused entry to Austria might itself generate media coverage for the Croatian cause. 
Some of the ideas that the émigrés conceived for the commemoration in 1985 
bordered on the comical. As noted, Bleiburg was located right across the border 
from Yugoslavia. Given this proximity, Petar Miloš proposed releasing approxi-
mately 100 balloons with the Ustasha seal and flag, with the intention that they 
would then fly into Yugoslavia. According to the SSUP SDB, “although he was 
47 SSIP SID, Commemorations in Bleiburg, undated (May 1985), ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132. See 
also Bruna Esih i Bože Vukušić, “Kako je nastalo Hrvatsko kulturno društvo Bleiburg”, 17 May 
2013, Dnevno.hr.
48 SSIP SID, Security Information, Activity of the Austrian Police in Monitoring the Prepara-
tions for the “Commemoration” in Bleiburg, 18 March 1985, ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132.
49 SSIP SID, Security Information: Austrian Police Demanded Information from the Organizers 
about the “Commemoration in Bleiburg”, 5 November 1985, ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132.
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warned by the Austrian police and ordered to destroy the balloons, Miloš stated that 
he would nevertheless find a way to send these balloons into Yugoslavia”.50
The members of HKD Bleiburg, and Croat émigrés generally speaking, were 
of course interested in attracting public attention for the Croat cause. The purpose 
of the commemorations was not just to pay homage to the victims of Bleiburg, but 
also to draw attention to what they saw as the systematic violation of the human 
rights of Croats in Yugoslavia. The émigrés wanted to rally international support 
for Croats and Croatian independence, and in November 1985 Petar Miloš encour-
aged his comrades to join Amnesty International.51 Given that these matters were 
overtly political, the Austrian authorities, however, took a bleak view towards them. 
In the specific case of the 1985 commemoration, the Croats in Austria tried to force 
the hand of the authorities by scheduling a press conference in Vienna in conjunc-
tion with the commemoration.52 In the view of the SID, a press conference would 
be “an escalation of the whole thing. ... We believe that it should be insisted to the 
Austrians through the Embassy in Vienna that the organizing of a press conference 
be thwarted.”53
Right up until the commemoration, the SID feared that the press conference 
would nonetheless proceed.54 On 23 April 1985, the émigré organization Hrvatsko 
podporno i prosvjetno društvo Matija Gubec (Croatian Support and Educational 
Society Matija Gubec) from Klagenfurt distributed a flyer announcing that a press 
conference would be held on 13 May in Vienna.55 However, on 9 May the Federal 
Police Directorate in Vienna wrote to Georg Aschner (aka Milivoj Ašner) – an émi-
gré who was also a notorious former Ustasha police chief suspected of war crimes 
– and informed him that the press conference was banned.56 It is worth noting that 
50 SSUP SDB(?), Ustasha Emigration Held Traditional Commemoration of “Bleiburg Victims” 
in Bleiburg in Austria, 31 May 1985, ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132. 
51 SSUP SDB, Commemoration in Bleiburg, 3 December 1985, ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132. 
DSC_0112. At this time, the Yugoslav authorities regarded Amnesty International as a hostile 
organization. SSUP, Administration for Investigation, Analysis and Information, Anti-Yugoslav 
Activity of Amnesty International, 26 July 1984, ARS, f. 1931, šk. 2325.
52 SSIP SID, Security Information: Agreement of V. Cecelja, M. Ašner and P. Miloš Regarding 
the Demonstration in Bleiburg, 27 April 1985, ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132.
53 SSIP SID, Security Information: Agreement of V. Cecelja, M. Ašner and P. Miloš Regarding 
the Demonstration in Bleiburg, 27 April 1985, ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132. 
54 SSIP SID, Security Information: HSS Specifies Date and Time for the Holding of Press Con-
ference in Vienna on the Occasion of Bleiburg, 8 May 1985, ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132. 
55 Hrvatsko podporno i prosvjetno društvo Matija Gubec – Landsmannschaft der Kroaten, Fly-
er, 23 April 1985, DSC_0082. 
56 Bundespolizeidirektion Wien, Letter to Dr. Georg M. Aschner, 9 May 1985, ARS, f. 1931, 
RTZ 132.
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copies of both the original flyer and the letter from the Federal Police Directorate 
are located in the archives. These and similar copies demonstrate that the infor-
mants of the Yugoslav security services were able to provide relevant documenta-
tion on a running basis. The archival holdings in Slovenia also include copies of 
commemorative pins that were produced for the fortieth anniversary of Bleiburg.
On 11 May 1985, the SSUP SDB was able to relay information from the SID 
according to which the police in Klagenfurt had explicitly banned all political de-
monstrations and insisted on a purely cultural event with performances by folklore 
groups.57 The director of the Federal Police Directorate in Klagenfurt Winkler had 
also demanded that Petar Miloš provide a translation of his planned speech by 25 
April and an overview of the entire program. If these items were not provided, so 
Winkler, the entire commemoration would be cancelled. 
In an initial summary, the SSUP SDB characterized the fortieth anniversary 
commemorations as “casual commemorations” (prigodne proslave), which had “oc-
curred within the range of evaluations of the Service”.58 On 11 May, a plaque dedi-
cated to “Croat victims” had been unveiled in a church in Klagenfurt, and in the 
evening a cultural folklore program had been held. The following day, approximate-
ly 500 people – “which was a lot less than what the organizer expected” – attend-
ed the main commemoration in Bleiburg.59 Several prominent émigré leaders such 
as Mate Meštrović and Mirko Vidović, whose participation had been announced, 
were absent, which had been commented upon by the attendees. Although the SSUP 
SDB was dissatisfied with the “extreme” nature of some of the speeches, the mea-
sures and restrictions imposed by the Austrian authorities were assessed to be “in 
accordance with the promises given earlier and [they] completely monitored this 
demonstration”.60 In addition, “the SDB through its operational positions performed 
a photo documentation of the demonstration, and measures were also taken to transfer 
this documentation to [Yugoslavia] as soon as possible for operational processing”.61
57 SSUP SDB, “Bleiburg 85” – Measures of the Austrian Organs, 11 May 1985, ARS, f. 1931, 
RTZ 132. 
58 SSUP SDB(?), Initial Information about the Commemoration of the Ustasha Emigration 
Held in Bleiburg, Austria, undated (May 1985), ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132.
59 SSUP SDB(?), Initial Information about the Commemoration of the Ustasha Emigration 
Held in Bleiburg, Austria, undated (May 1985), ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132.
60 SSUP SDB(?), Initial Information about the Commemoration of the Ustasha Emigration 
Held in Bleiburg, Austria, undated (May 1985), ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132. 
61 SSUP SDB(?), Initial Information about the Commemoration of the Ustasha Emigration Held 
in Bleiburg, Austria, undated (May 1985), ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132. A recent study has found that 
the Yugoslav State Security Service in 1979 possessed 72 “operational positions” in Austria, of 
which 40 were operatives and 32 were informants (Elste et al., 2015: 16).
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By the end of May 1985, the SSUP SDB had composed a more detailed sum-
mary of the fortieth anniversary commemorations. They noted the “extensive prepa-
rations” that had been designed to make that year’s observation special, particularly 
in order to “direct the attention of the international public to the ‘Croatian question’ 
and to bluntly provoke” Yugoslavia.62 This year’s broadly conceived demonstration 
had a special security significance because it concurs with the broader context of 
pressure on Yugoslavia, as regards among other things the belittling of its contribu-
tion to the defeat of fascism. The SSUP SDB pointed out that the commemorations 
had been billed as a way of asserting “the responsibility of Yugoslavia for the great-
est genocide against the Croat nation”.63
The Yugoslav security services of course also infiltrated the HKD Bleiburg and 
reported on its activities. There was no question of merely relying on the Austrian 
police to do the job. In this manner, an informant of the SID was able to report that 
Miloš had subsequently stated that HKD Bleiburg “will not proceed as they have 
been asked. Namely, they will not tell everything to [the Austrian police] and will 
do as they please and as such ‘deceive both the Yugo [sic] and the Austrians’.”64 The 
SID also obtained firsthand information about the content and attendees of HKD 
Bleiburg meetings, including knowledge that the members of the association were 
deliberately violating the Austrian police’s requirement that meetings be announced 
to the police in advance and be monitored by the police.65 Petar Miloš tried various 
tactics of obfuscation and subterfuge to circumvent police monitoring of the meet-
ings. However, it seems that most if not all planning meetings were attended by in-
formants for the Yugoslav security services, who dutifully reported on the proceed-
ings.66 (Incidentally, some within the Austrian police were also playing a double 
role, as one of them hoped to use the commemoration to secure extra business for a 
62 SSUP SDB(?), Ustasha Emigration Held Traditional Commemoration of “Bleiburg Victims” 
in Bleiburg in Austria, 31 May 1985, ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132. 
63  SSUP SDB(?), Ustasha Emigration Held Traditional Commemoration of “Bleiburg Victims” 
in Bleiburg in Austria, 31 May 1985, ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132.
64 SSIP SID, Security Information: Austrian Police Demanded Information from the Organizers 
about the “Commemoration in Bleiburg”, 5 February 1985, ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132; SSIP SID, 
Security Information: Activity of the Austrian Police Covering the Preparation of the “Com-
memoration” in Bleiburg, 18 March 1985, ARS f. 1931, RTZ 132.
65 SSIP SID, Security Information, Meeting of HKD Bleiburg Regarding Preparations for the 
Ustasha Commemoration in Bleiburg, 6 March 1985, ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132. See also SSIP, 
Meeting of Members of HKD Bleiburg Regarding Membership Dues, 15 March 1985; SSIP, 
Security Information: In HKD Bleiburg an Account of Expenses of the “Commemoration” in 
Bleiburg Was Conducted, 1 July 1985, ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132. 
66 SSIP SID, Security Information, Session of HKD Bleiburg in Freilassing Regarding Prepara-
tions for the “Commemoration”, 8 May 1985, ARS, f. 1931, RTZ 132.
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colleague who owned a restaurant in Krumpendorf.) However, Cecelja and others 
also advocated obeying the rules and regulations set by the Austrian authorities in 
order to avoid giving Yugoslavia further reason for countermeasures. In this sense, 
the members of HKD Bleiburg would themselves act to enforce these rules and 
regulations, and those deviating from the plan set by HKD Bleiburg or those who 
wanted to hold separate celebrations were identified as “saboteurs”. In the remain-
ing years before the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav State Security Service 
continued to keep a close eye on the Bleiburg commemorations.
Conclusion
There can be no doubt that the Bleiburg commemorations provided a focus for the 
activities of not just Croat émigrés, but also of the Yugoslav State Security Service. 
As an annual or semiannual gathering for Croat émigrés a stone’s throw from the 
Yugoslav border, Bleiburg provided a convenient event during which the guardians 
of the Yugoslav state could “take the temperature” – easily and with modest expense 
– of the émigrés’ activities. 
As we have seen in this article, Austria and Yugoslavia tended to cooperate in 
keeping tabs on the activities of Croat émigrés. Suspicious activities of persons of 
Yugoslav origin as well as incidents such as the theft of weapons or explosives near 
the Yugoslav border were reported immediately to the Yugoslav authorities by their 
Austrian colleagues, and restrictions were imposed upon the activities and utter-
ances of Croat émigrés. In the context of the Cold War and Austria’s neutrality, the 
Austrian state had a strong and consistent desire to maintain friendly relations with 
all of its neighbours. In 1965, the Yugoslav State Security Service summarized Aus-
trian cooperation as “some kind of oscillation between obligations from the conven-
tion on refugees, fulfilment of the clauses of the [bilateral] agreement (to not permit 
on its territory hostile activity against states of the anti-Hitler coalition) as well as 
the existing good neighbourly relations with Yugoslavia”.67 This remained a fitting 
description of Austrian attitudes until the fall of Yugoslavia, though a softening of 
attitudes towards the émigrés was, as noted, apparent in the 1980s. Despite this co-
operation, the Yugoslav authorities constantly suspected the Austrian authorities of 
not only being insufficiently interested in monitoring the émigrés themselves, but in 
fact even of supporting them. Additionally, the Yugoslav state security service also 
relied upon a well-developed network of informants in Austria, both among émigrés 
and among non-émigré Austrian citizens.
67 SSUP SDB(?), Report on the Ustasha Emigration in Carinthia, 9 June 1965, 20131105_084345.
jpg.
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This article is based overwhelmingly on primary sources produced by the Yu-
goslav State Security Service. We should of course be wary of taking the sources 
of the Yugoslav authorities in these official documents at face value. These sources 
provide only one side of the picture, and the people producing the documents had 
a vested interest in interpreting certain events and actions in a certain way. Like 
other security services in socialist countries, the Yugoslav State Security Service 
frequently provoked or even instigated the very types of activities it was trying to 
suppress or undermine, although not to the extent that apologists for the violent ter-
rorist acts of the émigrés sometimes claim. Exaggerations of the potentially violent 
intentions of the émigrés by individual agents or chiefs of section or department 
could also have served as bureaucratic justification of expenses and existence.
The Bleiburg commemorations provide a case study of a long-term operation 
of the Yugoslav security services aimed at curtailing and suppressing Croat émi-
gré activity. In the course of this operation, the Yugoslav security services made 
use of the entire spectrum of available methods and measures against the émigrés. 
Although the cases of Nikica Martinović and the bomb in 1966 show that the Yu-
goslav State Security Service was willing to use violent means in this struggle, the 
preferred means remained infiltration, disinformation, provocation and, of course, 
constant surveillance.68
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